


The background features a dark, abstract composition. On the left, there are dark red and purple ink-like splatters. On the right, there are vibrant blue and cyan ink-like splatters. A diagonal line separates these two color zones. The overall effect is ethereal and artistic.

# Defense Against the Dark Arts

- Aishwarya Kala

Pythian

# About ME



- Lead Database Consultant with Pythian
- Presenter at Oracle GroundBreakers Tour, EMEA tour, OGYatra, SOUG, AIOUG, Sangam
- AIOUG – Director of Special Projects



[@aishwaryakala13](https://twitter.com/aishwaryakala13) | <https://oratrails-aish.com> | [in aishwarya-kala-471b3616](https://www.linkedin.com/company/aishwarya-kala-471b3616)

# About Pythian

25

Years in Business

400+

Experts Across 5 Continents

500+

Customers Globally



Premier Partner

140+ Certifications

8 Specializations



Advanced Partner

175+ Certifications



Gold Partner

15+ Certifications



Platinum Partner

150+ Certifications



SAP Certified Partner

40+ Certifications



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### 3 membership tiers

 Oracle ACE Director

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 Oracle ACE Associate

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[ace.oracle.com](https://ace.oracle.com)

 Oracle ACE

**Nominate**  
yourself or someone you know:

[ace.oracle.com/nominate](https://ace.oracle.com/nominate)






# What are the Dark Arts?



# **Securing Database Network**




# Data In Transit







# Data In Transit




# Spells for Protecting 'Data In Transit'



Server




ENCRYPTION



Client


# Spells for Protecting 'Data In Transit'



Server




ENCRYPTION



Native Network Encryption


SSL Encryption



Client

# Spells for Protecting 'Data In Transit'

## Native Network Encryption



sqlnet.ora


- ENCRYPTION\_[server | client]
- ENCRYPTION\_TYPES\_[server | client]

AES-64, AES-128, DES, 3DES

The initial password supplied for a connection is always encrypted



# Spells for Protecting 'Data In Transit'



# Spells for Protecting 'Data In Transit'



## SSL/TLS v1.3 Encryption

### Signed Certificates

```
orapki wallet add -wallet /opt/oracle/admin/testdb/wallet -trusted_cert -cert ./labwork1_certificate_interm1.cer -pwd *****
orapki wallet add -wallet /opt/oracle/admin/testdb/wallet -trusted_cert -cert ./labwork1_certificate_interm2.cer -pwd *****
orapki wallet add -wallet /opt/oracle/admin/testdb/wallet -user_cert -cert labwork1_certificate.cer -pwd *****

$ orapki wallet display -wallet /opt/oracle/admin/testdb/wallet

Enter wallet password:
Requested Certificates:
User Certificates:
Subject: CN=labwork1.subnet.vcn.oraclevcn.com
Trusted Certificates:
Subject: CN=InCommon RSA Server CA,OU=InCommon,O=Internet2,L=Ann Arbor,ST=MI,C=US
Subject: CN=AAA Certificate Services,O=Comodo CA Limited,L=Salford,ST=Greater Manchester,C=GB
```

# Spells for Protecting 'Data In Transit'



## SSL/TLS v1.3 Encryption


### Listener Modifications

```
$ srvctl modify listener -p "TCP:1521/TCPS:2484"  
$ srvctl modify scan_listener -p "TCP:1521/TCPS:2484"
```

```
select instance_name, sys_context('userenv','network_protocol') from v$instance;  
  
INSTANCE_NAME  
-----  
SYS_CONTEXT('USERENV','NETWORK_PROTOCOL')  
-----  
testdb  
tcps
```

# Spells for Maintaining Integrity of 'Data In Transit'

## Network Data Integrity



Server



Client

sqlnet.ora


- `CRYPTO_CHECKSUM_[server | client]`
- `CRYPTO_CHECKSUM_TYPES_[server | client]`

MD5, SHA1, SHA2

If data is altered  
Data Modification, Replay Attack



# Spells for Protecting 'Data In Transit'



## Network Data Integrity

```
select NETWORK_SERVICE_BANNER from v$session_connect_info
where sid = sys_context('USERENV','SID');
```

```
NETWORK_SERVICE_BANNER
```

```
-----
```

```
TCP/IP NT Protocol Adapter for Linux: Version 19.0.0.0.0 - Production
```

```
Encryption service for Linux: Version 19.0.0.0.0 - Production
```


```
AES128 Encryption service adapter for Linux: Version 19.0.0.0.0 - Production
```

```
Crypto-checksumming service for Linux: Version 19.0.0.0.0 - Production
```


```
MD5 Crypto-checksumming service adapter for Linux: Version 19.0.0.0.0 - Production
```

# Spells for Filtering connections

- Oracle Audit Vault and Database Firewall (AVDF)
- “AVDF is a complete Database Activity Monitoring (DAM) solution that combines native audit data with network-based SQL traffic capture.”




# AVDF



# AVDF - Benefits

- Collect, Analyze, and Report
- Use of Machine Learning for Anomaly Detection
- Control of Traffic to the Database
- Ability to prevent SQL Injection Attacks



AVDF

A futuristic server room with blue lighting and hexagonal ceiling lights. The room is filled with server racks on both sides, and the floor is highly reflective. The ceiling features several glowing hexagonal light fixtures. The overall atmosphere is high-tech and secure.

# Securing Servers

# CVE – Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures

- Published Vulnerabilities

Bad Actors know about this !!!

- Oracle Releases Quarterly patches- for all its products

- OS
  - Servers as well as workstations
- Database, OEM, Exadata, ODA
  - Tuesday closest to 17<sup>th</sup> of Jan, Apr, July, Oct
  - Do Not Forget to Apply **OJVM** !



PSU, RU, RUR, Exadata Bundle Patches, Windows Bundle Patches, ODA Bundle Patches.....

# Security Patches

<https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpujul2022.html#AppendixDB>

## Affected Products and Patch Information

Security vulnerabilities addressed by this Critical Patch Update affect the products listed below. The product area is shown in the Patch Availability Document column.

Please click on the links in the Patch Availability Document column below to access the documentation for patch availability information and installation instructions.

Affected Products and Versions	Patch Availability Document
Autonomous Health Framework	Oracle Autonomous Health Framework
Big Data Spatial and Graph, versions prior to 23.1	Database
Enterprise Manager Base Platform, versions 13.4.0.0, 13.5.0.0	Enterprise Manager
Enterprise Manager for MySQL Database	Enterprise Manager
Enterprise Manager Ops Center, version 12.4.0.0	Enterprise Manager
JD Edwards EnterpriseOne Orchestrator, versions 9.2.6.3 and prior	JD Edwards
JD Edwards EnterpriseOne Tools, versions 9.2.6.3 and prior	JD Edwards
MySQL Cluster, versions 7.4.36 and prior, 7.5.26 and prior, 7.6.22 and prior, 8.0.29 and prior, and 8.0.29 and prior	MySQL
MySQL Enterprise Monitor, versions 8.0.30 and prior	MySQL
MySQL Server, versions 5.7.38 and prior, 8.0.29 and prior	MySQL
MySQL Shell, versions 8.0.28 and prior	MySQL
MySQL Shell for VS Code, versions 11.8 and prior	MySQL
MySQL Workbench, versions 8.0.29 and prior	MySQL
Oracle Agile Engineering Data Management, version 6.2.1.0	Oracle Supply Chain Products
Oracle Agile PLM, version 9.3.6	Oracle Supply Chain Products
Oracle Agile Product Lifecycle Management for Process, versions 6.2.2, 6.2.3	Oracle Supply Chain Products
Oracle Application Express, versions prior to 22.1.1	Database
Oracle Application Testing Suite, version 13.3.0.1	Enterprise Manager

# Oracle provides severity ratings – known as **Base Score**, for each vulnerability (based on CVSS 3.1 )

## Oracle Database Server Risk Matrix

This Critical Patch Update contains 9 new security patches plus additional third party patches noted below for Oracle Database Products. 1 of these vulnerabilities may be remotely exploitable without authentication, i.e., may be exploited over a network without requiring user credentials. 1 of these patches is applicable to client-only installations, i.e., installations that do not have the Oracle Database Server installed. The English text form of this Risk Matrix can be found [here](#).

CVE#	Component	Package and/or Privilege Required	Protocol	Remote Exploit without Auth.?	CVSS VERSION 3.1 RISK (see <a href="#">Risk Matrix Definitions</a> )									Supported Versions Affected	Notes
					Base Score	Attack Vector	Attack Complex	Privs Req'd	User Interact	Scope	Confidentiality	Integrity	Availability		
CVE-2020-35169	Oracle Database - Enterprise Edition	None	TCPS	Yes	9.1	Network	Low	None	None	Un-changed	High	High	None	12.1.0.2, 19c, 21c	
CVE-2022-21510	Oracle Database - Enterprise Edition Sharding	Local Logon	None	No	8.8	Local	Low	Low	None	Changed	High	High	High	None	See Note 1
CVE-2022-21511	Oracle Database - Enterprise Edition Recovery	EXECUTE ON DBMS_IR.EXECUTESQLSCRIPT	Oracle Net	No	7.2	Network	Low	High	None	Un-changed	High	High	High	None	See Note 1
CVE-2022-21565	Java VM	Create Procedure	Oracle Net	No	6.5	Network	Low	Low	None	Un-changed	None	High	None	12.1.0.2, 19c, 21c	
CVE-2022-24729	Oracle Application Express (CKEditor)	User Account	HTTP	No	5.7	Network	Low	Low	Required	Un-changed	None	None	High	Prior t	



# The problem with storing password in scripts

```
-bash-4.2$ ls -ltrh
total 4.0K
-rw-r--r--. 1 oracle oinstall 25 Jul  5 19:09 some-script.sh
-bash-4.2$
-bash-4.2$ ls -ltrh
total 4.0K
-rw-r--r--. 1 oracle oinstall 25 Jul  5 19:09 some-script.sh
-bash-4.2$
-bash-4.2$
-bash-4.2$ grep -i config some-script.sh
. ./some-script.config
-bash-4.2$
-bash-4.2$
-bash-4.2$ cat ./some-script.config
PASSWORD=critical_password
-bash-4.2$
```

# The problem with storing password in scripts

```
[akala@lab1~]$ ps -ef | grep rman
oracle    4669 26916  1 00:22 pts/1    00:00:01 rman target / catalog rman/rman_password@catalog_db
akala     20213 11800  0 00:23 pts/0    00:00:00 grep --color=auto rman
```

```
-bash-4.2$ strings /proc/841/environ | grep -i rman
RMAN_PASSWORD=myspassword
RMAN_USER=c##rman
```

# “Secure External Password Store (SEPS)”



## WALLET

- Oracle Wallet Manager (OWM)
- mkstore
- orapki

```
$mkstore -wrl /opt/oracle/admin/testdb/wallet -listCredential
Oracle Secret Store Tool Release 19.0.0.0.0 - Production
Version 19.3.0.0.0
Copyright (c) 2004, 2019, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.

Enter wallet password:
List credential (index: connect_string username)
1: testdb_bkp sys
```

# “Secure External Password Store (SEPS)”



## SQLNET.ORA

- WALLET\_OVERRIDE=TRUE
- WALLET\_LOCATION= the location of your wallet

## TNSNAMES.ORA

- MY\_WALLET\_DIRECTORY = < the location of your wallet >


```
$ sqlplus /@testdb_bkp
```

# Data at Rest – How is that vulnerable ?




- Access to unencrypted datafiles on your storage
- Compromised Database backups
- Compromised Database Exports

# Transparent Data Encryption



# Transparent Data Encryption




# Transparent Data Encryption

- Integrated with Compression, Datapump, RMAN !

**Save the TDE Key based on your backup retention!**

**You will need them if you restore**




**Advanced Security Option**




# OS & Audit Logs

- A bad actor with root or super privileges could edit the audit log and mask the **audited** actions
- Edit/modification of the messages, syslog files to **hide** suspicious activity



# Save the logs to an external location



# OS Logs & Auditing

## ● Examples Audit Rules for user actions


- Audit all OS Commands by users in the group “ DBA”
- Audit all OS Commands by oracle & grid accounts
- Audit all OS Commands under sudo /sudo su shells

## ● Examples Audit Rules for DB files


- Rule to Audit any changes to the Files like parameter, listener, oratab, sudoers, audit config, rsyslog, messages,

## ● Lock the config !


```
# Rule to Audit any changes to the database parameter files
-w /u01/app/oracle/admin/<sid>/pfile/init_sid.ora -p wa -k sid-init-change
```



# Protecting Data



# Connecting to your database



# Securing the Listener


- Avoid the use of **DEFAULT (1521)** Port & name **LISTENER**.
- Protect the listener config
  - Listener password – deprecated since 12.1 since it enables remote listener administration.
  - **OS Based** Authentication
- Limit the time that the resources can be held before authentication.
  - `sqlnet.INBOUND_CONNECT_TIMEOUT`
  - `listener.INBOUND_CONNECT_TIMEOUT_listener_name`

**Establish the connection + complete authentication**

**Send the connection request to listener**

**Listener timeout value Lower than sqlnet value !**

**(Dos) Attack**



**IP logged !**




# Securing the Listener

- Restrict the Services that can register with a listener
  - Prevents registration of malicious services running on remote notes
- Valid Node Checking (VNCR).
- Values
  - OFF | 0
  - ON | 1 | LOCAL
  - SUBNET | 2

```
VALID_NODE_CHECKING_REGISTRATION_listener_name = ON
```

(Dos) Attack




# Securing the Listener

- Restrict the Services that can register with a listener
  - Prevents registration of malicious services running on remote notes
- Valid Node Checking (VNCR).
- Values
  - OFF | 0
  - ON | 1 | LOCAL
  - SUBNET | 2

VALID\_NODE\_CHECKING\_REGISTRATION\_listener\_name  
REGISTRATION\_INVITED\_NODES\_listener\_name

(Dos) Attack



**RAC**

MOS Doc ID [1600630.1](#)



# Securing the Listener

- Secure the \$TNS\_ADMIN – review file permissions
- Using Logging EFFECTIVELY !


○ SEC\_PROTOCOL\_ERROR\_TRACE\_ACTION = { NONE | **TRACE** | LOG | ALERT }

- Remove unused Services

```
SELECT
  b.username,
  a.client_version, a.osuser,
  b.machine, b.module, b.program,
  a.client_charset, a.client_driver,
  b.service_name
FROM gv$instance_connect_info a, gv$instance b
WHERE a.sid = b.sid
and a.module = b.module
and a.authentication_type != 'INTERNAL'
ORDER BY client_version, username;
```

USERNAME	CLIENT_VERSION	OSUSER	MACHINE	MODULE	PROGRAM	CLIENT_CHARSET
SCOTT	12.1.0.2.0	scott	ADVAPP-P-REM033	salesforce.exe	salesforce.exe	WE8MSWIN1252
SCOTT	12.1.0.2.0	SALES	ADVAPP-P-REM033	salesforce.exe	salesforce.exe	WE8MSWIN1252
SCOTT	12.1.0.2.0	SALES	ADVAPP-P-REM033	salesforce.exe	salesforce.exe	WE8MSWIN1252
SCOTT	12.1.0.2.0	SALES	ADVAPP-P-REM013	salesforce.exe	salesforce.exe	WE8MSWIN1252
SCOTT	12.1.0.2.0	SALES	ADVAPP-P-REM013	salesforce.exe	salesforce.exe	WE8MSWIN1252
SCOTT	19.0.16.0.0	SALES	APFPOOLAPP-P-BOOK101	booking.exe	booking.exe	WE8MSWIN1252
ODM.NM1	19.1.0.0.0	OE	APFPOOLAPP-P-BOOK102	booking.exe	booking.exe	WE8MSWIN1252
SCOTT	19.0.16.0.0	SALES	APFPOOLAPP-P-BOOK102	booking.exe	booking.exe	WE8MSWIN1252
ODM.NM1	19.1.0.0.0	OE	APFPOOLAPP-P-BOOK102	booking.exe	booking.exe	WE8MSWIN1252
SCOTT	19.0.16.0.0	SALES	APFPOOLAPP-P-BOOK102	booking.exe	booking.exe	WE8MSWIN1252
ODM.NM1	19.1.0.0.0	OE	APFPOOLAPP-P-BOOK102	booking.exe	booking.exe	WE8MSWIN1252

(Dos) Attack



# If required – Capture the history

```
SELECT
    b.username,
    a.client_version, a.osuser,
    b.machine, b.module, b.program,
    a.client_charset , a.client_driver,
    b.service_name
FROM gv$session_connect_info a, gv$session b
WHERE a.sid = b.sid
    and a.serial# = b.serial#
    and a.AUTHENTICATION_TYPE != 'INTERNAL'
ORDER BY client_version, username;
```

USERNAME	CLIENT_VERSION CLIENT_DRIVER	OSUSER SERVICE_NAME	MACHINE	MODULE	PROGRAM	CLIENT_CHARSET
SCOTT	12.1.0.2.0	abc001 SALES	AD\APP-P-REM033	salesforce.exe	salesforce.exe	WE8MSWIN1252
SCOTT	12.1.0.2.0	abc360 SALES	AD\APP-P-REM033	salesforce.exe	salesforce.exe	WE8MSWIN1252
SCOTT	12.1.0.2.0	abc360 SALES	AD\APP-P-REM033	salesforce.exe	salesforce.exe	WE8MSWIN1252
SCOTT	12.1.0.2.0	abc591 SALES	AD\APP-P-REM013	salesforce.exe	salesforce.exe	WE8MSWIN1252
SCOTT	12.1.0.2.0	abc591 SALES	AD\APP-P-REM013	salesforce.exe	salesforce.exe	WE8MSWIN1252
SCOTT	19.0.16.0.0 ODPM.NET : 19.1.0.0.0	salesforceconnect OE	APPPPOOL\APP-P-BOOKI01	booking.exe	booking.exe	WE8MSWIN1252
SCOTT	19.0.16.0.0 ODPM.NET : 19.1.0.0.0	salesforceconnect OE	APPPPOOL\APP-P-BOOKI02	booking.exe	booking.exe	WE8MSWIN1252
SCOTT	19.0.16.0.0 ODPM.NET : 19.1.0.0.0	salesforceConnect OE	APPPPOOL\APP-P-BOOKI02	booking.exe	booking.exe	WE8MSWIN1252
SCOTT	19.0.16.0.0 ODPM.NET : 19.1.0.0.0	salesforceconnect OE	APPPPOOL\APP-P-BOOKI02	booking.exe	booking.exe	WE8MSWIN1252

# Authentication

- Weak Passwords
- Default Passwords for sys, system and other privileges accounts
- Weak Policies
- Compromised Passwords



Brute Force Attack

# Strengthening Authentication



**Brute Force Attack**

## The Obvious

- Strong Passwords – Password Verify Function
  - ora12c\_verify\_function & ora12c\_strong\_verify\_function - utlpwdmg.sql
- Init Parameters
  - SEC\_MAX\_FAILED\_LOGIN\_ATTEMPTS
  - SEC\_CASE\_SENSITIVE\_LOGON

**Create your Own**  
MOS Doc ID [2475845.1](#)

**Misleading ORA-01017: Invalid username/password;**

**Be aware of issues with Password Versions when using** SQLNET.ALLOWED\_LOGON\_VERSION\_xx

A Great [Blog](#) by Mike Detrich [https://mikedietchde.com/2017/04/24/having-some-fun-with-sec case sensitive](https://mikedietchde.com/2017/04/24/having-some-fun-with-sec-case-sensitive)

MOS Note: [2040705.1](#)

# Strengthening Authentication



- Account Profile
  - SESSIONS\_PER\_USER
  - FAILED\_LOGIN\_ATTEMPTS
  - **INACTIVE\_ACCOUNT\_TIME**
  - **PASSWORD\_ROLLOVER\_TIME** ( Backported to 19.12+!)
  
- DBA\_PROFILES
  
- Enforcing Best Practices for DBA's as well as users
  - Use nominative accounts (default)
  - For Privileged Tasks (use sysdba account)

**DBA\_USERS -> LAST\_LOGIN**



Brute Force Attack


# Using Strong Authentication



- Global Authentication and authorization.
  - SSL, Kerberos, or Windows native authentication
  - Centrally Managed Users (**Doc ID 2462012.1**)
- External Authentication
  - OS Based (e.g. SYSDBA, SYSOPER, SYSASM, SYSBACKUP, SYSDG, and SYSKM)
  - Network Based (e.g. Kerberos , Radius )

**Multi Factor Authentication !!**

# How MFA/2FA Works



Ref : Simon Pane's [Blog](#)

# Insider Threats


- Employee negligence
- Lack of robust security by a third-party vendor
- Susceptibility to Social Engineering Attack
- Malicious Actions of Employees





# Control Data Access

## Tools



Choose based on your requirement.

e.g. DBA's shouldn't view the data in application tables.

- Separation of Duties, privileged user controls ( Data Vault)
- Row-level control (VPD,RAS,OLS)
- Column-level control (VPD,RAS)

# Hide The Data

## Data Redaction

- Dynamic Data Masking of the result-set
- Based on username, IP, application context, and other session factors
- No changes to the data stored.

Advanced Security Option (with TDE)

```
SQL> SELECT CREDIT_CARD FROM SCOTT.CREDIT_CARD;
```

```
CREDIT_CARD
```

```
-----  
9879-9878-1001-8150  
4235-5347-2897-2900
```

Authorized Access




Redacted Access



```
SQL> SELECT CREDIT_CARD FROM SCOTT.CREDIT_CARD;
```

```
CREDIT_CARD
```

```
-----  
xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-8150  
xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-2900
```



```
CREDIT_CARD
```

```
-----  
9879-9878-1001-8150  
4235-5347-2897-2900
```

# Hide The Data

○ Data Redaction

○ **Data Masking**

- Substituting or replace the values based on rules
- For non-production, load testing environments
- Mask based on conditions generate random values with the same format, shuffle records

**Data Masking & Data Subsetting Pack**

Production



CREDIT\_CARD

9879-9878-1001-8150  
4235-5347-2897-2900

Actual Data

Test



CREDIT\_CARD

0000-8759-8524-8150  
0000-1000-9854-2900

Dummy Data

# Hide The Data

- Data Redaction
- Data Masking
- **Data Subsetting**
  - Remove the values based on rules i.e. Subset
  - Size down e.g. Development environment or a customer-specific test
  - Can Integrate with Masking
  - Conditions, Relative tables size i.e 5% of table data, Partitioning

Production



100k records

Actual Data

Dev



10k records

Less than 100 % of Actual Data – can be optionally masked

Data Masking & Data Subsetting Pack

# And Remember..

- Elevated Privileges
  - Grant Execute ANY Procedure

Can lead to users creating procedures that can truncate tables in ANY schema

- SQL92\_SECURITY
  - Set to TRUE

Users have **SELECT** privilege on a table when executing an **UPDATE** or **DELETE**

- SQL Injection Prevention Best Practices
  - Use **BIND** Variables
  - Avoid concatenated inputs for Dynamic SQL
  - Explore **DBMS\_ASSERT**

- Use Schema-only accounts.
- **AUDIT** as needed

# Mantra ! Reduce the Attack Surface



# Mantra ! Reduce the Attack Surface

- **Remove Not used database components**  
e.g. APEX (Doc ID [1518046.1](#))
- **User, roles**
- **DB links**



**As a thumb rule, never have anything that you do not need on your database!**



**But how will I find  
the **vulnerabilities**  
on my  
Database ?**





# DB Security Assessment Tool (DBSAT)

Free !!!

## Oracle Database Security Assessment

Highly Confidential

### Assessment Date & Time

Date of Data Collection	Date of Report	Reporter Version
Fri Apr 06 2018 21:22:00	Fri Apr 06 2018 21:27:28	2.0.1 (December 2017) - d526

### Database Identity

Name	Platform	Database Role	Log Mode	Created
[REDACTED]	Linux x86 64-bit	PRIMARY	ARCHIVELOG	Fri Oct 14 2016 14:27:00

<https://www.oracle.com/in/database/technologies/security/dbsat.html>

### Summary

Section	Pass	Evaluate	Advisory	Low Risk	Medium Risk	High Risk	Total Findings
<a href="#">Basic Information</a>	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
<a href="#">User Accounts</a>	4	0	0	3	4	0	11
<a href="#">Privileges and Roles</a>	3	16	0	0	0	0	19
<a href="#">Authorization Control</a>	0	0	2	0	0	0	2
<a href="#">Data Encryption</a>	0	1	1	0	0	0	2
<a href="#">Fine-Grained Access Control</a>	0	0	5	0	0	0	5
<a href="#">Auditing</a>	3	5	1	0	3	0	12
<a href="#">Database Configuration</a>	6	3	0	1	2	1	13
<a href="#">Network Configuration</a>	1	0	0	0	1	0	2
<a href="#">Operating System</a>	2	1	0	1	1	0	5
<b>Total</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>72</b>

## Sample Schemas

USER.SAMPLE		CIS
<b>Status</b>	Medium Risk	
<b>Summary</b>	Found 1 sample schema.	
<b>Details</b>	Sample schemas: SCOTT	
<b>Remarks</b>	Sample schemas are well-known accounts provided by Oracle to serve as simple examples for developers. They generally serve no purpose in a production database and should be removed because they unnecessarily increase the attack surface of the database.	
<b>References</b>	CIS Oracle Database 12c Benchmark v2.0.0: Recommendation 1.3	

## Inactive Users

USER.INACTIVE		
<b>Status</b>	Low Risk	
<b>Summary</b>	Found 4 unlocked users inactive for more than 30 days.	
<b>Details</b>	Inactive users: ██████████, ██████████, ██████████, ██████████	
<b>Remarks</b>	If a user account is no longer in use, it increases the attack surface of the system unnecessarily while providing no corresponding benefit. Furthermore, unauthorized use is less likely to be noticed when no one is regularly using the account. Accounts that have been unused for more than 30 days should be investigated to determine whether they should remain active.	

# Other Things

- DBSat provides privilege analysis as well a review of roles and user accounts
- Be on a lookout for Configuration Drift
- Use orachk diff report to keep a lookout on the health of your system

# References

- <https://www.imperva.com/learn/application-security/cve-cvss-vulnerability/>
- [TDE Explainer](#) by Russ
- [https://mikedietchde.com/2017/04/24/having-some-fun-with-sec\\_case\\_sensitive\\_logon-and-ora-1017/](https://mikedietchde.com/2017/04/24/having-some-fun-with-sec_case_sensitive_logon-and-ora-1017/)
- <https://blog.pythian.com/oracle-database-and-two-factor-authentication-2fa/>
- Elevate Privileges & DBSat <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8YsGxliLs2k>
- <https://www.oracle.com/in/database/technologies/security/dbsat.html>
- <https://blog.pythian.com/token-based-authentication-for-adb-with-iam-part-1/>
- <https://www.slideshare.net/AishwaryaKala/demystifying-the-use-of-wallets-and-ssl-with-your-database>

# THANK YOU !!

You can reach me



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